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A pioneer of a new monetary policy? Sweden's price-level
targeting of the 1930s revisited
Abstract
The paper re-examines Sweden's price level targeting during the 1930s which is regarded as a precursor
of today's inflation targeting. According to conventional wisdom, the Riksbank was the first central
bank to adopt price level targeting, although in practice giving priority to exchange rate stabilisation.
Based on Bayesian econometric techniques and the evaluation of new archival sources, we come to the
conclusion that defending a fixed exchange rate is hard to reconcile with the claim of adopting price
level targeting. This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the 1930s as a decade of great
policy innovations.
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Abstract
The paper re-examines Sweden’s price level targeting during the 1930s which is regarded as 
a precursor of today’s inflation targeting. According to conventional wisdom, the Riksbank 
was the first central bank to adopt price level targeting, although in practice giving priority 
to exchange rate stabilisation. Based on Bayesian econometric techniques and the evaluation 
of new archival sources, we come to the conclusion that defending a fixed exchange rate is 
hard  to  reconcile  with  the  claim  of  adopting  price  level  targeting.  This  finding  has 
implications for the prevailing view of the 1930s as a decade of great policy innovations.
1. Introduction
Sweden’s  monetary  policy during  the  1930s is  one of  the  most  fascinating  episodes  in 
Europe’s economic history of the twentieth century. In late September 1931, when Sweden 
suspended the gold standard, the Finance Minister made the public statement that from now 
on, monetary policy would be aimed at stabilising the internal price level. Judging from the 
record, the goal was achieved rather successfully. It is also impressive to see how intensely 
contemporaries  were  debating  monetary  policy  during  those  years.  Eminent  economists 
such as Gustav Cassel,  Eli  Heckscher and Bertil  Ohlin were participating in this  public 
discussion.
Because  of  the  remarkable  statement  by  the  Finance  Minister  and  because  Sweden 
recovered  more  rapidly  from  the  depression  than  most  other  European  countries,  its 
monetary policy has  repeatedly been invoked as a  new model,  most  enthusiastically  by 
Irving Fisher (1935). In recent times, it has also been cited as a sort of precursor of today’s 
inflation targeting (Svensson 1995, Bernanke et al.  1999).  In this paper, we examine the 
question of whether or not the Swedish central bank (Riksbank) was in fact targeting the 
price level.
In spite of the admiration for Sweden’s record during the 1930s, this  question has only 
rarely been studied systematically.  Besides contemporary scholars, only Lars Jonung and 
his  collaborators  have  seriously  approached  the  topic  (Jonung  1979a,  1979b,  Berg  and 
Jonung 1999, Fregert and Jonung 2004).1 This new research has led to a  revision of Fisher’s 
enthusiastic view. Jonung and Fregert (2004) acknowledge that the Riksbank became ‘the 
first  and so far  the  only central  bank to  have  adopted  price  stabilisation  or  price  level 
targeting  as  the  guideline  for  its  activities’.  But  they  also  point  out  that  the  Riksbank 
‘appears to have given priority to exchange rate stabilisation over price stabilisation’.
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Based  on  new  econometric  and  narrative  evidence,  we  propose  a  different  revision  of 
Fisher’s  view.  While  confirming  the  Riksbank’s  strong  bias  towards  exchange  rate 
stabilisation,  we argue that this finding can hardly be reconciled with the claim that the 
Riksbank  adopted  price  level  targeting.  Our  results  suggest  that  the  Riksbank  did  not 
reorient its policy after 1931, but continued to follow the monetary policy of the Bank of 
England and was targeting the sterling rate of the krona. Although being a major innovation 
in  the  history  of  Swedish  economic  thought,  price  level  targeting  had  no  practical 
importance for the decisions of the Riksbank in the 1930s. There was a large gap between 
official declarations  and actual policies pursued by the central bank – the same gap that has 
recently  been  observed with  respect  to  the  exchange  rate  policies  of  emerging  markets 
(Calvo and Reinhart 2002, Reinhart and Rogoff 2004, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005). 
Swedish  monetary  policy  was  essentially  made  in  London,  before  as  well  as  after  the 
devaluation of the krona in September 1931.
This finding has implications for the prevailing view of the interwar years as a decade of 
great policy innovations. Even in Sweden, where eminent economists came up with original 
and far-sighted ideas, policy makers were reluctant to abandon the notion that there was no 
alternative to a fixed exchange rate regime. The paper standard was regarded as a temporary 
measure, but not as an opportunity to pursue a more autonomous monetary policy. The most 
important  argument  in  favor  of  a  conservative  approach was  that  the  exporting  sectors 
would be negatively affected by a floating exchange rate. Only in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, this conviction gave way to a more positive view towards exchange rate 
flexibility.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  two gives  a  survey of  the 
exchange rate regimes adopted by Sweden and its Scandinavian neighbors. Section three 
summarises the official declarations which are the basis for the claim that the Riksbank in 
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fact adopted price level targeting. Sections four and five present our new econometric and 
narrative evidence. The paper ends with a short conclusion.
2. Scandinavian monetary policy during the interwar years
To capture the basic features of Swedish monetary policy during the interwar years, we first 
consider the Scandinavian context.2 As for many other European countries, the monetary 
history of Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the interwar period can be divided into 
four phases (Figure 1).3 In the first phase, beginning in 1919 and characterised by floating 
exchange rates, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were trying to bring their currencies back to 
the gold standard at the prewar parity. The three countries varied considerably with respect 
to the point of time at which they achieved this goal. Sweden was first, the krona was tied 
back to gold in  April  1924, one year  before Great  Britain  took this  step.  Denmark  and 
Norway experienced more problems, mainly because of a particularly severe banking crisis 
in the early 1920s. The  de jure restoration of the gold standard occurred in Denmark in 
January 1927 and in Norway in May 1928.
[Figure 1 about here]
The second period lasted from the restoration of the gold standard until its fall in September 
1931. All three Scandinavian countries followed the devaluation of the pound within days. 
For Denmark, the main reason was the high share of exports to the British market. No less 
than 60 percent of Danish agricultural products were shipped to the British ports. Norway’s 
decision to suspend the gold standard was motivated by the importance of sterling for the 
shipping business. For the Swedish Riksbank, the main problem was of financial nature. In 
the course of 1930, some Swedish commercial banks had accumulated a substantial foreign 
short-term deficit  in order to provide liquidity to Ivar Kreuger.  When in July 1931, the 
German banking crisis broke out triggering a general rush for liquidity, the banks covered 
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their  foreign  short-term  deficit  by  buying  exchange  reserves  from  the  central  bank. 
Consequently, when the British pound was devalued and another attack on the krona was 
launched, the Riksbank had too few reserves to defend the old parity.
In  the  third phase,  lasting  from fall  of  1931  to  summer  of  1933,  the  currencies  were 
officially floating. The Scandinavian countries chose different paths. Denmark engineered a 
competitive  devaluation  in  January 1933 after  New Zealand,  its  main  competitor  in  the 
British market for agricultural products, had done so. When suspending the gold standard, 
the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  authorities  declared  that  they  would  aim at  stabilising  the 
purchasing power of the currency. In Sweden, the Riksbank constructed a new consumer 
price  index,  while  the  government,  the  Riksdag  and  several  economists  extensively 
discussed monetary policy matters in public. In Norway, by contrast, the official statement 
of September 1931 was not followed by  a new framework.
The  fourth phase began with the decision of all three Scandinavian countries to tie their 
currencies to sterling. The peg lasted from July 1933 to the outbreak of World War II: the 
Danish krone was 23 percent above the old sterling parity, the Norwegian krone ten percent, 
and the Swedish krona seven percent. The peg was questioned a few times. In 1935, Danish 
farmers were demanding a second competitive devaluation, and in late 1936, some Swedish 
economists pleaded a revaluation of the currency after a considerable increase of British 
wholesale prices. In the end, however, the pegs were maintained at the same parity.
3. The official declarations
The claim that the Riksbank adopted price level targeting after the suspension of the gold 
standard in September 1931 rests on two pillars. The first one is the relative price stability 
Sweden enjoyed after  abandoning the gold standard. Whereas the US and the gold bloc 
countries continued to experience deflation well into the 1930s, Sweden’s domestic price 
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level remained almost perfectly stable after September 1931. Only in two periods there were 
notable deviations from price stability as measured by the index of consumption constructed 
by the Riksbank: in early 1933 and in the first two quarters of 1937 (Figure 2).
[Figure 2 about here]
The second pillar consists of a series of official declarations and reports. It all started on 
Sunday evening, 27 September 1931, when Finance Minister Felix Hamrin of the ruling 
center-right  coalition  declared  that  from now on  ‘monetary  policy  should  be  aimed  at 
stabilising  the  internal  purchasing  power  of  the  krona  by  all  means  possible’.4 The 
statement, based on ideas of Knut Wicksell and partly drafted by Swedish economists, was 
supposed  to  reassure  the  public  that  the  authorities  would  prevent  inflation  after  the 
suspension of the gold standard. Hamrin also declared that Sweden wanted to return to the 
gold  standard  as  soon  as  possible.  The  departure  from gold  was  seen  as  a  temporary 
measure.
Hamrin’s short sentence soon became the base for an intensive debate among politicians, 
central bankers and economists. The Riksbank responded to the new situation by sending a 
detailed questionnaire to three Swedish economists, Gustav Cassel, David Davidson and Eli 
Heckscher.5 In their answers, returned at the end of October, they agreed on a number of 
issues. In particular, they all recommended postponing the restoration of the gold standard 
as long as international financial markets were in turmoil, and favored stabilising prices at 
the current level, stressing that the exchange rate should not be fixed, but be used to achieve 
this  goal.6 Also in October,  the Riksbank constructed a new consumer price index on a 
weekly basis in order to have a more accurate picture of the dynamics of price movements. 
Finally, on 11 February 1932, the Riksbank explained its interpretation of the new monetary 
program in a letter requesting the government to renew the provisional suspension of the 
gold  standard.7 The  intention,  the  Board  wrote,  was  to  stabilise  the  average  level  of 
domestic consumer prices, but it would allow a moderate increase of the price index within 
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a certain range insofar as it was caused by external movements such as rising import and 
export prices or appreciating foreign exchange rates. On the other hand, an increase of the 
price index caused by domestic inflation would not be tolerated. The Board also emphasised 
that  indicators  other  than  price indices  were being taken into consideration,  particularly 
conditions affecting productivity and stocks in various industries.
As the Riksbank was under the direct  control of both houses of the Swedish parliament 
(Riksdag), politicians of all parties began to be involved in the debate.8 In May 1932, the 
Banking Committee drafted a detailed report aimed at developing a more precise monetary 
program which became the new basis for all further discussions.9 Three points are worth 
mentioning. First, the Committee rejected the idea of tying the krona to gold or the British 
pound and argued that the domestic price level and ‘the needs of our own economy’ should 
be the starting point for monetary policy. Second, it wanted the Riksbank to prevent both 
inflation and deflation, but also advocated a moderate rise of the price level. And third, the 
Committee encouraged the Riksbank to keep interest rates as low as possible. In June 1933, 
the Banking Committee published another report drawing from the recommendations of a 
committee of experts.10 The Banking Committee gave the instruction to engineer a rise of 
the internal wholesale price level without causing inflation, and provided the Riksbank with 
more independence, explicitly stating that the choice of instruments was up to the central 
bank.11
Taken  together,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  these  official  declarations  represented  a  major 
innovation in Europe’s history of monetary policy. For the first time, there was a serious 
public  discussion  about  how  to  stabilise  the  internal  price  level  in  the  absence  of  an 
international monetary system of fixed exchange rates. The crucial question, however, is 
whether or not this discussion had any practical meaning for the policy of the Riksbank. 
Berg and Jonung (1999) as well as Fregert and Jonung (2004) come to the conclusion that 
the  Riksbank  in  fact  adopted  price  level  targeting  and  therefore  had  to  accept  certain 
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restrictions.  The  following  two  sections  develop  a  more  skeptical  view  of  Sweden’s 
monetary policy in the 1930s.
4. Narrative evidence and descriptive statistics
A series of statements by he Riksbank governor Ivar Rooth suggest that the Swedish central 
bank did not implement what was said in public by the Finance Ministry and the Banking 
Committee of the Riksdag. Of course, besides Rooth there were other personalities trying to 
determine the course of Sweden’s monetary policy.  In particular,  Ernst Wigforss, Social 
Democratic  Finance  Minister  since  the  fall  of  1932,  advocated  a  stabilisation  of  the 
domestic price level.12 Likewise, Dag Hammarskjöld, since 1935 adviser to the Riksbank 
and a close ally of Bertil Ohlin and other economists of the so-called Stockholm School, 
supported a modern approach (Jonung 1991). But as shown below, the narrative sources 
clearly suggest that the governor was by far the most influential figure.
We studied the minutes of the Governing Board and the official publications. To have a 
more direct access to the inner thoughts of policy makers, we also looked for sources of 
private communication. Two discoveries were of particular value: the correspondence of the 
Bank  of  England  with  the  Riksbank  and  other  Swedish  authorities,  and  the  private 
correspondence of Ivar Rooth, the Governor of the Riksbank.13
These latter documents clearly show that the Riksbank never intended to adopt price level 
targeting,  but was primarily concerned about a stable sterling rate of the krona. We cite 
three letters in order to support our claim. In late September 1933, Rooth wrote to O.M.W. 
Sprague,  Harvard  professor  of  economics  and  temporary  assistant  to  the  United  States 
Secretary of the Treasury.14 For obvious reasons – the US had suspended the gold standard 
in the spring of 1933 –, Sprague was interested in the Swedish experience with managing its 
currency. Rooth answered that in the months following the fall of the krona, the Riksbank 
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was  mainly  concerned  with  emergency  measures.  It  replenished  its  foreign  exchange 
reserves and was coping with the consequences of the Kreuger crash. But by the end of May 
1932, once these problems were solved, ‘we decided to try to keep sterling steady around 
19.50 which was the actual level at that time’. Rooth gave four reasons for the sterling peg: 
to help exports, to stop deflation, to increase liquidity which drove down interest rates, and 
to encourage Swedish holders of foreign bonds to repatriate their money and to sell their 
foreign exchange to the Riksbank. Thus, stabilising prices was only one of four major goals. 
A  stable  exchange  rate  was  the  priority,  not  price  level  targeting.  Therefore,  Rooth 
concluded:
My personal opinion is that it is of the utmost importance to the whole economic life 
of a nation which like Sweden for its standard of living is to such a great extent 
depending upon foreign trade, to have fairly stable quotations. I think that I dare say 
that also in order to get a rising price-level, stable foreign exchanges are better than 
the erratic movements of these rates which the world has suffered from ever since 
September 1931.
There had only been one episode, Rooth added, in which the Riksbank deviated from this 
course.  At  the  end of  October  1932,  when the British  pound weakened against  the  US 
dollar, ‘we unpegged sterling’, as he put it, and let the krona appreciate considerably. But 
only six months later,  after the Swedish currency depreciated back to the level of 19.50 
kronor per sterling, the peg was restored.
A second citation is taken from a critical comment Rooth gave on Bertil Ohlin’s speech in 
Zurich in early 1936.15 Rooth rejected Ohlin’s claim that the Riksbank had sought a stable 
exchange rate vis-à-vis sterling, because it shared the same monetary policy goals as the 
Bank of England. The true reason had been, he argued, that Sweden’s foreign business was 
for the most part invoiced in sterling: ‘It was particularly important for a small country like 
Sweden depending so strongly on its foreign trade to inspire trade and industry with trust in 
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our currency.’ The stable sterling rate, he went on, had also contributed to the transmission 
of the inflationary tendency of English prices to Sweden. And he concluded that pegging the 
krona to sterling and lowering interest rates were ‘the only thing we did in order to influence 
prices’.16
A third statement is even more telling. In February 1938, Rooth wrote to Randolph Burgess, 
Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:
Some  American  professors,  e.g.  Professor  Irving  Fisher,  believe  that  it  is  an 
achievement  by us in the Riksbank that  prices have been fairly steady up to the 
middle of 1936. I have told Professor Fisher before and I am sorry to have to tell you 
now that what we have done is merely that we have carried out a fairly conservative 
central  banking policy.  In  fact  we have never  tried  to  do anything  directly  with 
regard to prices.17
Of course, all three of Rooth’s statements are  ex-post assessments. But there is sufficient 
evidence suggesting that his memory did not distort the past in a fundamental way. Other 
archival sources confirm that the Riksbank’s main concern was to have a stable sterling 
parity.  It reached this goal by following the policy of the Bank of England, and by first 
accumulating and then actively managing foreign exchange reserves. Certainly, Rooth was 
also concerned about  prices.  But drawing from his  experience  during the  gold standard 
period, he was convinced that only a stable exchange rate could provide a reliable nominal 
anchor and thus guarantee price stability in the long run. The domestic purchasing power of 
the krona, he stated shortly after the suspension of the gold standard, was ‘certainly not a 
sufficiently firm foothold’.18 He appears to have made a correct statement when explaining 
that the Riksbank had practiced a fairly conservative central banking policy.
As for setting the discount rate, the minutes of the Board show that the Riksbank wanted to 
make sure the Swedish rate would never fall below the British one, and it was only ready to 
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lower it when the Bank of England took the same step (Figure 4). The only time the Board 
acted on its own was in the aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard in September 
1931. On 8 and 19 October, it cut the discount rate from eight to six percent, whereas the 
Bank of England kept it at six percent. These decisions, however, were not the expression of 
an independent course, but resulted from the insight that in order to contain inflation after a 
steep depreciation of the krona it was not necessary to have such a high interest rate.19 The 
Riksbank had decided to increase the discount rate from six to a record high of eight percent 
on 27 September, i.e. on the same day Finance Minister Hamrin announced the suspension 
of  the gold standard and made his  famous  statement  on the future course of  Sweden’s 
monetary policy. The exceptionally high interest rate was part of the campaign to reassure 
the public that the authorities would not allow inflation to emerge and investors to speculate 
against the krona.20
[Figure 4 about here]
A clear sign that Rooth consciously avoided stepping out of line with British policy is his 
opposition to a discount rate cut on 14  January 1932.21 One member of the Board proposed 
it because Swedish business leaders had protested against the restrictive policy for some 
time,  but Rooth prevailed  with his  cautious  approach.  Only when the  Bank of  England 
lowered its rate from six to five percent on 18 February, he was ready to relax monetary 
conditions, although still reluctantly. On the same day he wrote to London  that he was very 
surprised by the British decision and asked ironically: ‘What has happened? Has any of the 
Indian maharadjas sent you all their gold, are you preparing a conversion of the Warloan or 
have you decided to follow the suggestion made in the last copy of The Economist, viz. to 
“reflate” the prices to the level of 1928?’22 Due to his mistrust against expansionary policies, 
Rooth proposed to follow the Bank of England only halfway to 5.5 percent and to wait for 
the consequences.23 Two weeks later, with the fear of inflation diminishing, the Riksbank 
lowered the discount rate by another half percent in order to bring it down to the British 
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level – the reference to the Bank of England being a crucial argument.24 In the following 
months, the Riksbank continued to follow the British policy, although with some time lag. 
From March to June, the Bank of England cut the discount rate from five to two percent, the 
Riksbank lowered it to 3.5 percent in the second and third quarter of 1932 and to 2.5 percent 
in the course of the following year. Again, the decisions were inspired by the policy of the 
Bank of England.25
As for the management of the exchange rate,  Rooth’s memory proved again to be accurate. 
Only in the immediate aftermath of the suspension of the gold standard, the Riksbank was 
hesitating to seek an exchange rate peg since the situation remained chaotic for some weeks. 
Rooth considered the stabilisation of the domestic price level only as a temporary policy to 
prevent inflation and to reassure the public. His next goal was to tie the krona to sterling as 
soon  as  the  future  path  of  British  monetary  policy  would  take  shape.  Accordingly, 
Siepmann, a close adviser of Governor Montagu Norman, reported to the British Treasury in 
mid-October that according to Rooth the Riksbank’s attempt ‘to control exchange in such a 
way as to maintain the stability of internal prices’ was the only alternative ‘in a period of 
transition’.  And he  added  that  before  going  to  a  meeting  at  the  Bank for  International 
Settlements  (BIS)  in  Basle,  Rooth  ‘was  frequently  asking  me  over  the  telephone  for 
indications  of  our  policy’.26 One  week  later,  Siepmann  summarised  another  telephone 
conversation  with Rooth:  ‘He told me again that  Sweden can have no monetary policy 
except to keep internal prices stable, so far as possible, until our decision is known.’27
Since the British themselves did not know what kind of monetary policy they should pursue, 
Rooth did not receive a clear answer. Nevertheless, a few weeks later he became convinced 
that the moment for a sterling peg had come. His decision was motivated by a rapid fall of 
the krona against sterling from late October on (Figure 5). According to the minutes of the 
Board, Rooth had strong reservations against exchange rate fluctuations and was afraid of 
speculative attacks against a weakening krona.28 A close friend of his, who endorsed the 
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sterling  peg,  believed  that  ‘now  the  British  pound  plays  the  role  of  gold’.29 On  18 
November, Rooth got the approval of the Board, informed the Bank of England, and  turned 
to the commercial banks for help, since the Riksbank was still suffering from the depletion 
of its  foreign exchange reserves following the defense of the gold standard two months 
earlier.30 He convinced them to ration their credits on a voluntary basis in order to improve 
the  trade  balance  and  to  impede  speculation  against  the  krona.31 Whether  or  not  the 
agreement with commercial banks stabilised the exchange rate is hard to say, but it almost 
certainly  hampered  the  recovery  of  the  economy  (Lester  1939).  In  any  case,  Rooth 
succeeded in implementing his exchange rate stabilisation scheme, because the krona only 
temporarily fell below the old sterling parity. 
[Figure 5 about here]
Only two months after the declaration by the Finance Minister and a few weeks after the 
exchange with the economists about a new monetary policy, the Riksbank violated the new 
guidelines by seeking a sterling peg at the old parity. The maneuver reversed the recovery of 
wholesale prices. Subsequently,  it would have depressed Swedish consumer prices, if the 
Kreuger  crash  in  March  1932 had  not  forced  the  Riksbank to  be  more  expansionary.32 
Accordingly, the policy was not well received by the press and the political authorities.33 In 
reaction to the widespread criticism, the Riksbank tried to reassure the government of its 
loyalty by adding a few paragraphs in the upcoming formal request for another renewal of 
the provisional suspension of the gold standard. As mentioned above, these lines written on 
11  February  1932  have  been  cited  as  an  expression  of  its  commitment  to  price  level 
targeting. Yet, a closer reading of this key text reveals that the Riksbank, while endorsing 
the overall goal of price stability,  gave only lukewarm support to the new guidelines by 
pointing out that ‘for the time being each monetary program can only be valid until further 
notice’.34 Consequently, the Banking Committee of the Riksdag was not entirely satisfied 
with this explanation and sent a questionnaire while preparing its famous May report cited 
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above.35 The Committee also tried to ensure a better control of the the Riksbank's policy  by 
formulating a more specific monetary program and openly criticising the deflationary bias 
of the bank. However, the result of this endeavor was negative. By stating that monetary 
policy should not only be aimed at stabilising the domestic price level, but also be based 
based on ‘the needs of the economy’, the monetary program became fuzzy. The committee 
also blurred the lines by demanding that monetary policy should not be schematically bound 
to any special price index. And in any case, further events would show that the views of the 
deputies were not particularly relevant for the Board of the Riksbank.
The Kreuger crash in mid-March 1932 forced the Riksbank to step in as lender of last resort 
and triggered a selling wave of krona assets. The Riksbank tried to defend the old sterling 
parity, but due to the lack of foreign exchange reserves, it had to give up its resistance.36 The 
exchange rate regime remained the same, however: in May, the Riksbank tied the krona 
back to the British pound at  19.50 kronor per sterling – in his  letter  to Sprague,  Rooth 
referred to this decision as the beginning of the sterling peg which lasted until the end of the 
1930s.
In the following months, Swedish wholesale and consumer prices remained almost perfectly 
stable. The literature has interpreted this restoration of price stability as a success of the 
Riksdag.  The  Riksbank,  they  argue,  had  to  accept  certain  restrictions  imposed  by  the 
Banking Committee’s May report and thus explicitly adopted price level targeting.37 This 
view is, however, hard to reconcile with the facts. First, there are no archival sources hinting 
to a change of mind within the Riksbank. Second, the depreciation of the krona was forced 
upon policy makers. The Riksbank would have preferred maintaining the old sterling parity 
regardless of the deflationary effect of such a policy. And third, further events would show 
that  the Riksbank continued to  aim for  the  old parity.  The undervaluation  of the krona 
mainly served to replenish foreign exchange reserves in order to have the means to drive the 
krona towards the former level. The opportunity came in the fall of 1932, when the British 
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pound weakened considerably.  In the beginning of this phase, the Riksbank let the krona 
depreciate, but after 20 November it stabilised the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, 
bringing the krona back to the old sterling parity (Figure 5). When in December the British 
pound reversed its course and appreciated against the US dollar, the Riksbank maintained 
this parity, inducing a considerable real appreciation of the krona and a decline of wholesale 
prices.38 The operation failed, however. in early 1933, the krona was not strong enough to 
follow the British pound in its upward movement and fell back to a lower level although the 
Riksbank tried to stem the tide by buying kronor and selling British pounds.
Thus, like in November 1931, the Riksbank openly violated the guidelines set up by the 
government and the parliament. The first to have noticed it was Lester (1939), who talked to 
key policy makers at the time. It is difficult to add written evidence to this interpretation 
because all  the minutes  of the relevant  Board meetings  have disappeared.  However,  we 
found one clear piece of evidence showing that Rooth wished to bring the krona back to the 
old  sterling  parity.  In  late  October  1932,  a  close  friend  reminded  him  of  a  recent 
conversation about the future exchange rate of the krona: ‘… when I expressed my hope that 
the  krona  would  appreciate  against  sterling,  you  explained  that  nobody awaited  such  a 
movement more eagerly than you.’39 In addition, the comparison with the sterling rate of the 
Norwegian krone is revealing in this respect: whereas the Norwegian krone appreciated only 
by  2.5  percent  against  sterling  (from  19.90  in  September  to  19.41  in  December),  the 
Swedish  krona  climbed  by  six  percent  towards  the  old  sterling  parity  (from  19.50  in 
September to 18.32 in December). Clearly, the difference was due to the more aggressive 
exchange rate management by the Riksbank. It was not a natural result of market forces.
In reaction to this deflationary monetary policy,  Finance Minister  Ernst Wigforss of the 
Social Democrats appointed a committee of experts whose recommendations were adopted 
by the Banking Committee and the Riksdag. As mentioned, the Committee demanded that 
the Riksbank should allow a moderate rise of the internal wholesale price level, but was free 
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how to implement this strategy. Besides, it repeated the conclusion of its own report of May 
1932 that the krona should not be fixed to gold or to the British pound. Nevertheless, in July 
1933 the Riksbank explicitly tied the krona to the British pound at the current rate (19.40 
kronor per sterling).40 According to Rooth’s letter to Randolph Burgess, the Vice-President 
of the New York Fed, the Banking Committee’s report was irrelevant: ‘In 1933 the banking 
committee wrote a fairly theoretical programme about the necessity of increasing prices. 
However, they said that the decisions to be taken in each case had to be made by ourselves 
and that we had to take the responsibility for the decisions.’41 The timing of the decision and 
the fact that Denmark and Norway established a sterling peg at the same time suggest that 
two factors were important: the conclusion of a trade agreement of all three Scandinavian 
countries  with  the  UK  in  May  1933  and  the  failure  of  the  London  World  Economic 
Conference that became apparent after Roosevelt’s bombshell message in early July 1933.
In any case, besides the obvious violation of the Banking Committee’s opposition to an 
exchange rate peg, the crucial question is whether the krona was pegged to sterling in order 
to fulfill the monetary program or in order to stabilise the exchange rate for its own sake. As 
in the beginning there was no conflict of interest, the question is hard to answer. The price 
level remained very stable because British wholesale prices and the dollar rate of sterling 
finally stabilised after an extended period of fluctuations. Yet, when in the second half of 
1936 British wholesale and consumer prices increased by roughly ten percent, a sterling peg 
could not be reconciled with price level targeting anymore. Accordingly, several Swedish 
economists, among them Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher, correctly pointed out that the 
Riksbank should unpeg the krona from sterling and allow an appreciation in order to keep 
the domestic price level constant (Figure 7). Investors were also expecting a strengthening 
of the krona and exchanged foreign exchange for krona – the reserves of the Riksbank 
almost doubled from the middle of 1936 and to late 1937. The Governing Board, however, 
did not change its policy, although it knew what was at stake. In a letter to Montagu Norman 
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at New Year’s Eve, Rooth mentioned that the krona perhaps would be revalued against 
sterling. Norman remarked in an internal memo:
The Swedes have made a lot of noise about their new monetary policy of basing the 
level of the krona on a price index and thus maintaining the level of prices. In fact 
they have up till now had to do nothing but keep pegged on sterling and we have 
kept their prices steady for them. Rooth is certainly thinking hard about raising the 
krona rate on sterling, and if sterling prices show a strong rising tendency he will 
probably do something.  His letter  is, I think, meant to warn us about this and to 
express the hope that if and when he moves his rate on sterling we shall pat him on 
the  back  and  not  accuse  him  of  upsetting  things  and  disturbing  the  currency 
agreement.42
Stockholm’s  uneasiness  becomes  also  apparent  in  a  note  which  a  senior  official  of  the 
Foreign Office sent to the Treasury and ultimately to the Bank of England:
At  the  Swedish  Legation  last  night  Mr.  Sandler  [Swedish  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs] took me aside and said that he wanted to ask my views about the Swedish 
exchange. (…). I said that was a matter on which I could offer no opinion. … there 
would be no sort of objection from our side if the Swedish Government thought it 
right to go back to their old parity. (…). The question was essentially one which the 
Swedish Government had to settle by reference to its own internal situation rather 
than by reference to what was being done in any other country.43 
By the end of April 1937, when Swedish consumer prices had risen by four percent over the 
preceding two quarters  and did not stop increasing,  the Riksbank decided to maintain a 
stable sterling rate, thus once more violating the principles of price level targeting.44 The 
arguments put forward by Rooth reveal how strongly he believed in the virtue of having a 
stable exchange rate. First, he warned of the negative psychological effects of changing the 
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parity. Second, he pointed out that a revaluation of the krona would only temporarily stop 
the rise of domestic prices. World prices would continue to increase and to drive Swedish 
prices upward, no matter what the Riksbank was doing. The option of letting the krona float 
in order to uncouple the Swedish economy from world inflation was not even taken into 
consideration. In Rooth’s view, exchange rate stability was ‘the most important condition 
for international trade’, whereas flexible exchange rates would only lead to protectionism 
and hamper trade. Third, a revaluation of the krona would reduce the profitability of the 
exporting sectors, even more so as Finland and Norway, both direct competitors, were not 
considering such a step. And finally, he expressed his hope, without giving any evidence, 
that the rise of British price would soon stop. Clearly, these arguments were not compatible 
with a modern monetary policy.
In sum,  narrative  evidence  shows that in four instances  the Riksbank consciously acted 
against  the principles of price level targeting.  First,  in November 1931, it  prevented the 
krona from falling below the old sterling parity,  thus reversing the recovery of Swedish 
wholesale  prices.  If  the  Kreuger  crash in  March 1932 had  not  made  the  exchange rate 
depreciate  by  7  percent,  Sweden  would  have  experienced  a  marked  deflation  in  1932. 
Second, in the last quarter of 1932 the Riksbank made the krona climb to the old sterling 
parity,  thus  inducing  a  steep  real  appreciation  and  depressing  wholesale  and  consumer 
prices. Again, the outcome would have been even worse, if further events had not driven the 
sterling  rate  of  the  krona  back  to  the  level  where  it  had  been  before  the  adventurous 
maneuver.  Third,  the  Riksbank  explicitly  pegged  the  krona  in  July  1933,  although  the 
Banking Committee of the Riksdag had clearly excluded such a policy. And finally, in early 
1937 the Riksbank refused to unpeg the krona after British wholesale prices dramatically 
rose. Instead, by doing nothing it imported inflation and let the domestic price level increase 
by five percent within two quarters. On the basis of this evidence, it seems hard to maintain 
the claim that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting. The primary goal was rather 
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to advance the recovery of the exporting sectors by stabilising the exchange rate, first at the 
old parity, then at an undervalued level.
5. Econometric evidence
To test the qualitative evidence from the previous section, we run a Bayesian VAR covering 
the period from 1920 to 1939. In contrast to the traditional structural VAR, the Bayesian 
approach allows for time varying parameter matrices and heteroscedasticity, thus enabling 
us to analyse monetary policy across regime changes not only in terms of changes in the 
transmission mechanism, but also in terms of a change in the nature of the structural shocks. 
In  particular,  we  can  observe  whether  or  not  the  end  of  the  gold  standard  in  1931 
represented such a change. The set-up of the model is explained in the Appendix.
The crucial question is whether the Riksbank was trying to stabilise the price level after 
1931 as official declarations suggest or whether it continued to target the sterling rate as 
under the gold standard regime lasting from 1924 to 1931. We are aware of the fact that 
these two strategies need not to be mutually exclusive. It is possible that the central bank 
was  stabilising  the  domestic  price  level  by  maintaining  a  sterling  peg.  The  evidence 
assembled in the last section suggests, however, that the Riksbank was primarily targeting 
the exchange rate and not the domestic price level. In some periods, the stable sterling rate 
also  delivered  price  stability,  but  when  in  1936-37  a  conflict  of  interest  emerged,  the 
Riksbank was ready to accept an increase of domestic prices violating the principles of price 
level targeting.
The  selection  of  the  variables  is  straightforward.  The  Riksbank’s  monetary  policy  is 
measured by the discount rate and alternatively the monetary base. We consider both series 
because the Riksbank is not changing its discount rate after 1933 anymore  (Figure 4), but 
the choice of the monetary variable does not change the basic results. To account for the 
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changing  relationship  between  exchange  rate  and  price  stability,  we  chose  the  British 
discount rate,  the nominal exchange rate (krona against  sterling) and two Swedish price 
indices  (wholesale  prices  and  cost  of  living)  as  our  main  variables  influencing  the 
Riksbank’s  monetary  policy.  The  British  discount  rate  is  picked  because  the  narrative 
evidence shows that the Riksbank stabilised the exchange rate by following the discount rate 
steps  taken  by  the  Bank  of  England.45 Finally,  to  account  for  other  factors  possibly 
influencing  the  monetary  policy  of  the  Riksbank  we  include  two  other  variables:  the 
business  cycle  of  the  real  economy  and  the  movement  of  gold  and  foreign  exchange 
reserves. To reflect the business cycle, we used union data of Swedish unemployment in 
absence of monthly indices of industrial production covering the whole period. It would be 
surprising if  the Swedish monetary authorities  had reacted to the output  gap as modern 
central banks do, but is it essential as a control variable.  Under the gold standard regime, 
central banks are supposed to raise interest rates when reserves are approaching or falling 
below a certain minimum. In Sweden, the legal limit of the gold cover ratio was 40 percent 
during most of the period under study.  By including foreign exchange reserves into the 
cover ratio, we have used a broad definition of this indicator. The focus on the gold cover 
ratio  would  be  too  narrow,  because  it  does  not  account  for  the  reason  why  Sweden 
suspended the gold exchange standard in late September 1931. As mentioned above, this 
regime  shift  was  not  primarily  due  to  close  trade  relations  with  Great  Britain,  but  to 
Sweden’s  foreign  short-term debt.  Even  prior  to  the  fall  of  sterling,  the  Riksbank  was 
running out of foreign exchange reserves while the gold reserves remained relatively stable. 
Only in the final stage, did the Riksbank also begin to use them in order to defend the gold 
standard.  More generally,  foreign exchange reserves reflect  market  forces and economic 
policies better than gold reserves.
In short, the Bayesian VAR has six variables: the discount rate of the Bank of England (I*), 
the nominal sterling rate of the krona (E), the Swedish unemployment rate (U), the Swedish 
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price  index  (WPI  or  CPI),  the  gold  and  foreign  exchange  cover  ratio  (GCR)  and  the 
monetary policy variable (I or M0). The British discount rate can be considered exogenous 
as it is evident that the monetary policy of the Bank of England was not influenced by the 
economic development of a small open economy such as Sweden. Moreover, treating I* as 
exogenous variable allows a more parsimonious specification of the VAR.  The triangular 
identification scheme for the structural shocks (see equation (2) in the Appendix) is given 
by the way monetary policy was conducted  at  the time.  The Stirling rate  E is  strongly 
influenced by the policy conducted by the Bank of England. Therefore, we have ranked it 
first whereas the following four variables are only indirectly affected by the British business 
cycle or by British economic policies. We have chosen the nominal exchange rate in order 
to test whether the Riksbank was targeting the exchange rate or whether it let the krona float 
while targeting the domestic price level. The unemployment rate U, as noted, is a proxy for 
Sweden’s  real  economy.  As  it  depends  indirectly  on  the  British  interest  rate  and  the 
exchange rate, it ranks second in our model. The consumer price index CPI is included on 
third rank to test directly whether or not the Riksbank was targeting the domestic price level 
after 1931. The gold cover ratio GCR was the most important indicator for monetary policy 
under  the  gold  exchange  standard  and  is  therefore  ranked  immediately  ahead  of  the 
monetary base, respectively the Swedish interest rate. The monetary data are taken from the 
Bank of England and the Riksbank, the consumer prices from the Swedish National Board 
of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) and the Economist, the unemployment rate from the 
Swedish  Trade  Union  Confederation  (Landsorganisationen).  All  data  are  on  a  monthly 
basis.
The main results displayed in Figures 3.1 to 3.8 show the posterior distributions of impulse 
responses (lag 3, lag 6, lag 9, and lag 12). The 95% highest posterior density intervals (lag 3 
lag 6, and lag 12) can be found in Tables 1 and 2.46  
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Did the Riksbank adopt price level targeting? If this had been the case, we would expect a 
significant reaction of the Swedish discount rate or the monetary base to a price shock. In 
both  cases,  however,  the  impulse  responses  reveal  quite  the  opposite.  The  Swedish 
monetary policy indicators hardly move, regardless of the choice of price index and the  lag. 
In this respect, the Bayesian VAR provides strong evidence supporting what the statements 
of  the  Riksbank  governor  Rooth  suggest.  The  actual  policy  did  not  match  the  official 
declarations  made by the Finance  Ministry and the Banking Committee  of  the Swedish 
parliament. Up to lag 6, the Swedish interest rate increases in response to a British interest 
rate shock. In contrast, when we use the Swedish monetary base we do not see a strong 
reaction of the Riksbank.
[Figures 3.1-3.4 around here]
Regardless of the monetary variable  we use the impulse responses strongly suggest that 
there  was  no regime  change in  the  early  1930s.  This  observation  amounts  to  a  further 
argument against the hypothesis that the Riksbank in fact adopted price level targeting after 
the suspension of the gold standard in September 1931. Keeping nominal exchange rate 
completely  stable  after  1932,  in  addition  to  following  the  British  discount  rate  without 
obvious structural  break requires price levels  to adjust  – this  finding is  not in line with 
stabilising the price level as target of Swedish monetary policy.
In conclusion, econometric evidence demonstrates that the basic orientation of Sweden’s 
monetary policy remained constant throughout the interwar years and that the Riksbank did 
not  adopt  price  level  targeting  in  the  1930s.  Its  main  priority  was  to  maintain  a  stable 
exchange sterling rate by following the discount rate policy of the Bank of England. Thus, 
the Bayesian VAR strongly supports the main findings drawn from the narrative sources. 
[Tables 1 and 2 around here]
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6. Conclusion
In  the  1930s,  Sweden’s  monetary  policy  was  admired  for  its  success  in  stabilising  the 
domestic price level after 1931 while most other European countries needed more time to 
dig themselves out of the deflationary spiral. According to Irving Fisher the success was due 
to a regime change in 1931: instead of targeting the exchange rate, Riksbank from now on 
aimed its policy at stabilising consumer prices, similarly like today’s inflation targeters.
Since Jonung (1979a), this positive view has been revised. In particular, the belief that the 
Riksbank fully abandoned exchange rate targeting in favor of price level targeting has been 
rejected.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this  strong  skepticism  towards  the  actual  practice,  the  new 
conventional view still claims that the Riksbank truly adopted price level targeting which 
imposed certain restrictions on its monetary policy.
In this paper, we try to show that this view is inconsistent. By employing a Bayesian VAR 
and analyzing new archival sources we have come to the conclusion that the Riksbank not 
only gave priority of exchange rate stabilisation over price level stabilisation, but also never 
intended to adopt price level targeting. As governor Ivar Rooth himself repeatedly pointed 
out in private letters, his aim was to have stable exchange rates in order to foster trade and to 
have a strong anchor for monetary policy.  Following this conviction stemming from his 
experience during the gold standard period before and after World War I, he did not hesitate 
to violate the principles of price level targeting when he believed that the exchange rate 
needed to be stabilised.
This finding raises the question as to what extent the 1930s were a defining moment in 
Europe’s monetary history. Sweden has often been cited as an important example of how 
some policy makers broke with the past. We already know that fiscal policy was much less 
counter-cyclical and innovative than many observers originally thought.47 The results of this 
paper suggest that the same is true for monetary policy. The Riksbank could have pursued a 
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more  flexible  monetary  policy,  but  it  did  not  even try  because  policy  makers  regarded 
floating exchange rates as harmful to trade and investment.48 
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Table 1: Highest Posterior Density Intervals (68 Per Cent) for the Responses to Price Level Shocks
CPI WPI
Interest Rate Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12
Jan 26 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 27 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 28 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 29 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 30 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.010 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 31 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 32 -0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 33 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 34 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 35 -0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 36 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 37 -0.008 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 38 -0.008 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 39 -0.010 0.010 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.010 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
Monetary 
Base Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12
Jan 26 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 27 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 28 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 29 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 30 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 31 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 32 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 33 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 34 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 35 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 36 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 37 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 38 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Jan 39 -0.002 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
For an interpretation of highest posterior density intervals, see footnote 46.
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Table 2: Highest Posterior Density Intervals (68 Per Cent) for the Responses to British Interest Rate Shocks
CPI WPI
Interest Rate Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12
Jan 26 0.011 0.041 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.039 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Jan 27 0.010 0.041 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.040 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Jan 28 0.010 0.042 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.040 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
Jan 29 0.009 0.040 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.038 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000
Jan 30 0.007 0.039 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.039 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000
Jan 31 0.006 0.038 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.041 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000
Jan 32 0.006 0.038 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.041 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000
Jan 33 0.006 0.039 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.040 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000
Jan 34 0.008 0.042 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.043 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000
Jan 35 0.007 0.043 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.044 -0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000
Jan 36 0.007 0.043 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.043 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000
Jan 37 0.006 0.044 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.047 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000
Jan 38 0.005 0.044 -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.045 -0.003 0.007 0.000 0.000
Jan 39 0.004 0.044 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.049 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.001
Monetary 
Base Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12 Lag 3 Lag 6 Lag 12
Jan 26 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 27 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 28 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 29 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 30 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 31 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 32 -0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 33 -0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Jan 34 -0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Jan 35 -0.010 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Jan 36 -0.010 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Jan 37 -0.012 0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000
Jan 38 -0.014 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.013 0.009 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000
Jan 39 -0.014 0.008 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.014 0.010 -0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000
For an interpretation of highest posterior density intervals, see footnote 46.
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Figure 1: Scandinavian exchange rates
(percentage of prewar gold parity, monthly data)
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Figure 2: Index of cost of living by Riksbank and
by National Board of Health and Welfare (monthly data)
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Figure  3.1:  Response  of  Swedish  Discount  Rate  to  Price  Level  Shocks  (One  Standard 
Deviation)
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 25 per cent and 75 per cent 
quantiles.
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Figure  3.2:  Response of  Swedish  Monetary Base  to  Price  Level  Shocks  (One Standard 
Deviation)
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 25 per cent and 75 per cent 
quantiles.
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Figure  3.3:  Response  of  Swedish  Discount  Rate  to  British  Interest  Rate  Shock  (One 
Standard Deviation)
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 25 per cent and 75 per cent 
quantiles.
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Figure  3.4:  Response  of  Swedish  Monetary  Base  to  British  Interest  Rate  Shock  (One 
Standard Deviation)
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The solid line is the median of the posterior distribution, and the dashed lines indicate the 25 per cent and 75 per cent 
quantiles.
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Figure 4: Discount rates of Bank of England and  Riksbank (monthly data)
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Figure 5: Sterling rate of krona and wholesale prices of Sweden and UK
(monthly data)
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Figure 6: Geweke's χ2 Test: Interest Rate Model
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Figure 7: Geweke's χ2 Test: Money Stock Model
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Appendix: Time-varying VAR
The vector autoregressive (VAR) model is basend on Primiceri’s (2005) extension of the 
approach by Cogley and Sargent (2005). It allows for both time-varying parameters and 
heteroscedasticity. Consider an n variables VAR of order p with t=1,…T observations:
x t =ct∑
j= 1
p
A j,t x t− j +υt=
ct A1, t  A p,t  1x t−1⋮x t− p+υt=
A t Z t−1 +υt ; υt ~ N 0,t .
(1)
Note that both the parameter matrices  Aj,t and the variance-covariance matrix  Ω t are time 
varying. Vectorisation of the last line in equation (1) gives
x t= Z t−1' I⊗ n α t +υt .  (1’)
The error υ t has the structure 
υt =Bt
−1 Σ t εt ;ε t ~ N 0, I n  , (2)
with
B t= 1 0  0b21 ,t 1 ⋱ ⋮⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0bn1,t  bnn−1, t 1  ;Σ t=
σ1, t 0  0
0 σ2, t ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
0  0 σ n,t
 ,
3
where Σ t is the time-varying scaling matrix for the structural shocks ε t, and Bt is the matrix 
modeling the contemporaneous interaction between the variables in the system. In the case 
of Cogley and Sargent (2005), this matrix is constant over time, in the version of Primiceri 
(2005)  used  here,  the  parameters  are  time-varying.  This  has  the  advantage  that  the 
contemporaneous response of the system to structural shocks is time dependent. However, 
the triangular structure which allows identification does not change over time.  
The  equations  of  movement  for  the  elements  of  the  VAR parameter  matrices  and  the 
components of the variance-covariance matrix are random walks:
α t =α t−1+ν t ;
b t=b21 ,t b31 ,t b32 ,t  bnn−1, t 
′
=b t−1+ςt ;
ln σ t=ln σ t−1+ηt .
(3)
The last  line  ensures  that  the  standard  deviations  are  non-negative.  By assumption,  the 
errors are not correlated among each others and follow multivariate normal distributions:
ε tν tς t
η t
~ N 0, V  ;V=  I n 0 0 00 Q 0 00 0 S 00 0 0 W  . (4)
To parameterise as parsimoniously as possible, we fix the order of the VAR to 1, and  use 
UK interest  rates  as  exogenous  variables.  To  arrive  at  the  posterior  distribution  of  the 
parameters, we have 4 MCMC steps (for details, see Primiceri 2005):
1. Draw α t conditional on bt,  σ t,  t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix  Q (the 
variance-covariance  matrix  for  the  structural  shocks  ε t is  fixed  to  be an  identity 
matrix, see equations 2 and 4). Draws for which the VAR turns out to be unstable 
are rejected. The prior distribution for α t is independent normal, with expected value 
4
and variance covariance matrix coming from an OLS estimation of a time-constant 
VAR based on the first 50 observations.
2. Generate  bt conditional on  α t,  σ t,  t=1,…,T, and the variance-covariance matrix  S. 
The prior distribution of  bt  is independent normal; the expected value comes from 
the  lower  triangular  component  of  an  LDL-decomposition  of  the  error  variance-
covariance matrix  of the OLS estimation in step 1, and the variance covariance- 
matrix is set to the identity matrix.
3. Generate σ t conditional on α t, bt, t=1, …,T, and the variance-covariance matrix W. 
The prior distribution for log σ t  is also independent normal, with an expected value 
coming  from  the  diagonal  component  of  an  LDL-decomposition  of  the  error 
variance  covariance  matrix  of  the  OLS  estimation  in  step  1,  and  the  variance 
covariance- matrix is set to the identity matrix.
For step 1 to 3, the conditional posteriors turn out to be normal. In each case, the 
underlying model is a state-space model (e.g., Harvey 1992), and the sequence of 
time  varying  parameters  is  generated  following  the  multi-move  Gibbs  sampling 
approach proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994). 
4. In the last step, the variance-covariance matrices  Q,  S, and  W are drawn from an 
inverted Wishart distribution, conditional on α t,  bt,  σ t, t=1,…,T. The parameters of 
the inverted Wishart prior for Q come from the OLS estimation in step 1, and for S 
and W, they are set to I×1e-2.
The entire procedure is repeated 60000 times, and the first 10000 draws are discarded. After 
burn-in, we keep every 10th realisation of the chain. To judge convergence of the chain, we 
calculated the Geweke’s χ2-test (e.g. Geweke 2005, p. 149-150). Since there are too many 
parameters to look at, convergence is demonstrated for the maximum absolute eigenvalue of 
the VAR parameter matrix A at each point in time, comparing the mean over a subsample of 
4
the first 10 per cent of realisations of the chain with the mean based on the last 50 per cent. 
The numerical standard errors used to construct this test statistic are based on periodogram 
estimates  at  frequency zero with 4 per cent,  8 per  cent  and 15 per cent autocovariance 
tapers.49 The  probabilities  that  the  two means  are  the  same  are  displayed  in  Figures  1 
(interest rate model) and 2  (money stock model). The Figures show that convergence is not 
a problem here.
[Figure 6 about here]
[Figure 7 about here]
It is straightforward to calculate the distribution of the impulse-response matrix at lag j and 
time t from the distribution of the VAR-parameters and the stochastic volatilities (note that 
since the lag is set to one, we have just one parameter matrix):
IR j,t=A t
j Bt
−1 Σ t . (5)
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